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Information di¤usion in networks with the
Bayesian Peer Inuence heuristic
Gilat Levy, LSE and Ronny Razin, LSE1
Abstract: Repeated communication in networks is often considered to impose large
information requirements on individuals, and for that reason, the literature has resorted
to use heuristics, such as DeGroots, to compute how individuals update beliefs. In
this paper we propose a new heuristic which we term the Bayesian Peer Inuence (BPI)
heuristic. The BPI accords with Bayesian updating for all (conditionally) independent
information structures. More generally, the BPI can be used to analyze the e¤ects of
correlation neglect on communication in networks. We analyze the evolution of beliefs
and show that the limit is a simple extension of the BPI and parameters of the network
structure. We also show that consensus in society might change dynamically, and that
beliefs might become polarized. These results contrast with those obtained in papers that
have used the DeGroot heuristic.
1 Introduction
Repeated communication in groups and more generally in networks is often considered
to impose large informational requirements on individuals. Individuals may be unaware
of the structure of the network, so that while they know who they communicate with,
they might not know their neighborsneighbors. This implies that it may be very di¢ cult
to trace the path that a piece of information takes in an environment with repeated
communication.
The network literature has typically taken one of two avenues. One avenue is the fully
rational approach whereby individuals are fully aware of the network and the equilibrium
and update using Bayes rule (see Acemoglu et al 2014). The second avenue is to assume
that individuals follow a particular heuristic when updating. A leading example is the
DeGroot heuristic, where individuals average theirs and othersbeliefs, as in Golub and
Jackson (2010) and De Marzo et al (2003). These are two polar ways to model information
di¤usion, one based on full rationality and the other based on an adhoc heuristic.
1Levy: Department of Economics, LSE, Houghton St. WC2A 2AE, UK; g.levy1@lse.ac.uk. Razin:
Department of Economics, LSE, Houghton St. WC2A 2AE, UK; r.razin@lse.ac.uk. We thank Erik
Eyster, Francesco Nava, Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch, Matthew Rabin and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi for helpful
discussions. This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme under grant agreement No SEC-C413.
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In this paper we analyze information di¤usion in networks by using a new heuristic
which is based on rational foundations for all information structures which are condi-
tionally independent. Specically, we assume a simple model of communication in which
individuals sincerely transmit their beliefs to each other.2 Sobel (2014) and Levy and
Razin (2016) show that if individuals believe that their marginal information sources gen-
erate (conditionally) independent signals, then upon communication, Bayesian updating
yields a belief that is proportional to a simple multiplication of their posterior beliefs.
Thus, if p(!) is a common prior about a state of the world ! 2 
 (nite), and qi(!) is
the posterior belief of individual i that the state is ! following some signal realisation; the
resulting belief following communication of posteriors in a group of n such individuals is
1
p(!)n 1
Q
i2N
qi(!)P
v2

1
p(v)n 1
Q
i2N
qi(v)
;
where the formula can be easily extended to non-common priors, as well as to more
general perceptions of correlation (Levy and Razin 2016). In this paper we adopt this for-
mula as an updating heuristic, which we term the Bayesian Peer Inuence (BPI) heuristic.
We analyse information di¤usion in networks using the BPI.3
There are several advantages to using the BPI. First, it is a heuristic which is rational for
all environments in which the information sources of individuals are truly (conditionally)
independent. A benet of using the BPI in these environments is that it is information
structure free: Both the modeler and individuals in the network do not need to know
the exact information structures of others in order to compute the properties of beliefs in
the network. We therefore do not need to make any specic assumptions about informa-
tion structures. Second, in other, more complicated, environments, the BPI is simple to
compute. The BPI is an order-free heuristic, which -as we show- lends itself easily to the
computation of limit beliefs.
The BPI also allows us to isolate the implications of correlation neglect arising from
repeated communication from other types of incorrect information processing biases. Cor-
relation neglect has recently attracted attention in the literature and is a natural bias to
arise in network communication.4 As information ows in a network, individuals may be
2The assumption of sincerity is quite reasonable in the context of information di¤usion in networks;
as is the case in most of the literature, for such environment it is common to assume that individuals are
not strategic (see the survey in Jackson 2011). The assumption that people communicate their beliefs is
motivated by the di¢ culty to remember and communicate the exact details of information structures.
3The BPI is used for the case of binary states and particular information structures by Du¢ e and
Manso (2010) and Eyster and Rabin (2010, 2014).
4Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) analyze the e¤ect of correlation neglect on the polarisation of beliefs.
De Marzo et al (2003) and Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin (2015) study how it a¤ects the di¤usion of
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unaware that they are exposed to the same information they have been exposed to in the
past, and thus if they treat information as independent, correlation neglect is likely to
arise. When using the BPI to analyze repeated communication in a network, we are in
e¤ect assuming that correlation neglect is the only departure from rationality.
Our main results are the following. First, we characterise the limit beliefs of repeated
communication in networks and show that they are easily computed. Similarly to Golub
and Jackson (2010) and De Marzo et al (2003) the limit beliefs depend both on the
initial information in the network and the structure of the network. Beliefs converge
to the mode of a belief that extends the BPI to account for the initial beliefs and the
eigenvector centrality of the individuals in the network. In particular, beliefs converge to
the mode of j2N(q
j
0(!))
j where qj0(!) is the initial belief of individual j and 
j is the
j0th element of the vector  that is parallel to the PerronFrobenius eigenvector.
The result about the mode allows us to provide sharp predictions about the limit beliefs,
which qualitatively di¤er from those obtained under the DeGroot heuristic. Specically, a
recent theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the question of whether po-
larised beliefs in society arise because of correlation neglect (see for example Glaeser and
Sunstein 2009, Schkade et al 2000, and Sobel 2014 for an alternative view). In our model
polarisation arises as beliefs become degenerate in the limit. Using the BPI we show how
polarisation depends both on the network conguration as well as on the nature of the
initial belief. Relatedly, the BPI also implies that consensus might change dynamically;
that is, even when all have the same beliefs -as long as these are not degenerate- indi-
viduals will continue to update from each other. These two results cannot arise within
the DeGroot framework where limit beliefs are always in the convex hull of initial group
beliefs and in which when consensus is reached there is no further updating. This im-
plies that the BPI can account for phenomena such as Groupthinkwhereby even group
homogeneity implies polarisation.
We show that with the BPI an individuals inuence on the group depends both on
his centrality but also on the quality of his information. In particular, the variance of
an individuals belief is important. An individual holding beliefs with high variance has
little e¤ect on othersbeliefs. Again, this contrasts with the DeGroot heuristic under
which only the expectation of an individuals belief (or some exogenous parameters) can
determine his inuence. For example, a uniform belief will imply that an individual has
no inuence on others in our model, no matter his centrality in the network. In contrast,
in the DeGroot model, such an individual will be inuential as long as his expectation is
information in social networks. Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) and Levy and Razin (2015a, 2015b) explore
the implications for group decision making in political applications. Recent experimental evidence is in
Eyster and Weizsacker (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009) and Enke and Zimmermann (2013).
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di¤erent than othersand the higher is his centrality in the network.
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. We contribute to the literature
on information di¤usion in networks (Golub and Jackson 2010, 2012) by suggesting a new
heuristic, which, as in machine learning, is motivated by a Naive-Bayesapproach. Our
analysis complements a recent paper by Molavi, Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2015).
Whereas we assume rationality up to correlation neglect, Molavi et al (2015) take an
axiomatic approach, focusing on imperfect recall. They characterize a family of heuristics
which embed the BPI as a special case. Although our focus is on communication, our
paper is also related to the social learning literature which studies how individuals learn
from othersactions (e.g., Bala and Goyal 1998). We show that society can converge to
be fully condent in one state of the world (the mode of the adjusted BPI), which is not
necessarily the true state of the world.5
Some recent experimental literature examines the predictions of the theory of infor-
mation di¤usion in networks, mainly comparing the fully Bayesian updating with the
DeGroot heuristic. Choi et al (2012) nd that the Bayesian model ts the data well
in three-player networks, although such networks are perceived to lack statistical power
to distinguish between the DeGroot and the fully Bayesian model. Grimm and Mengel
(2014) show that the DeGroot model is better than the Bayesian at predicting correct
guesses, while the Bayesian model is better at predicting whether consensus arises. They
conclude that agents are semi-Bayesian in the sense that they do take into consideration
the network structure when updating, albeit in a rudimentary way. Mueller-Frank and
Neri (2013) show that consensus is hard to achieve when agents are heterogenous, even
when the network is strongly connected.6 Our analysis also falls between the Bayesian
model and the naive one, and our results illustrate how consensus can be dynamic which is
an interesting avenue to explore in future experiments. Finally, Philippos et al (2017) con-
sider how individuals update when they consider di¤erent issues (our analysis focuses on a
unidimensional state of the world) and show how the type of unidimensional disagreement
that arises depends on the communication channels.
5See also Eyster and Rabin (2010) and Gagnon-Bartch and Rabin (2015). Other papers such as
Guarino and Jehiel (2013) show that society can still learn the truth, even in the presence of information
processing biases.
6Both Grimm and Mengel (2014) and Mueller-Frank and Neri (2013) suggest alternative updating
approaches, as we do here. We di¤er as our heuristic is always Bayesian in the rst period, and departs
from rationality only because of correlation neglect.
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2 The Model
Information and initial conditions: There is a nite set N of individuals who have
a common uniform prior on the state ! 2 
; where 
 is nite. The analysis can be
easily extended to non-uniform prior (as shown in the introduction) as well as to known
non-common priors. Each individual j 2 N holds an initial posterior qj0(!). We assume
that qj0(!) > 0 for any ! 2 
 and any j, and that these initial posterior beliefs were
derived by the individuals observing signals coming from some (conditionally) independent
information sources. Let q0= (q
j
0(:))j2N denote the vector of original beliefs.
The network and communication: The individuals inN are organized in a network.
Let T denote the matrix of links where Tij = 1 if there is a link between i and j and 0
otherwise. For simplicity we assume that the links are non-directed. Note also that Tii = 1:
At any period, individuals i; j communicate their beliefs to each other if Tij = 1: After
each period k  1, individual i updates her belief using the BPI heuristic (see below) to a
new posterior qik(!): When communicating at period k + 1, individuals truthfully reveal
their beliefs, qik(!).
The Bayesian Peer Inuence (BPI) heuristic: Let qik= (q
j
k(:))j2N jTij=1 denote the
vector of beliefs observed by individual i at period k+1. If the individual thinks that these
beliefs have been derived from independent information sources, then Bayesian updating
implies that after observing qik, individual i updates to the belief:
7
qik+1(!) =
Q
j2N jTij=1
qjk(!)P
v2

Q
j2N jTij=1
qjk(v)
:
Note that the BPI heuristic is order-free, information-structure free, and rational when-
ever all beliefs stem from conditionally independent information sources. While in the
rst stage of communication information is truly independent across individuals, this will
not be the case in the second period as information in the network will become repeated.
We assume that individuals use the BPI at any stage. Thus, while belief updating is fully
rational in the rst stage of communication, correlation neglect arises at later stages and
updating is then not fully Bayesian.
3 Limit beliefs
We now nd conditions on the environment under which the limit beliefs exist and char-
acterise them. Formally, the primitives of the environment are the network structure and
7See Levy and Razin (2016) Proposition 1 and Sobel (2014) Proposition 5.
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the set of original beliefs, (T;q0): Note that at period k, the individual will have been
exposed to the posterior of j a number of times equal to all the possible paths in the
network from j to i that involve up to k steps. If individuals use the BPI, the order in
which information was heard does not matter. In matrix notation, the posterior after k
rounds can be written as,
qik+1(!) =
i2N(qi0(!))
TkijP
v2
 i2N(q
i
0(v))
Tkij
; (1)
where Tk = TT :::T| {z }
k times
:
Therefore, to study the convergence of this process we need to study the convergence
of Tk: If T is irreducible and aperiodic, then it is primitive and we can use the Perron
Frobenius Theorem about the convergence of primitive matrices.
In particular let  = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn+ be the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of T. The
following is an assumption about q0 and .
Assumption 1 arg max!2
 j2N(q
j
0(!))
j is unique.
Note that Assumption 1 will be satised generically when randomly choosing q0 and
T.
Before moving on to our main result, we illustrate with examples what happens when
Assumption 1 is violated.
Let 
 = f0; 1g. Consider a network with four agents N = f1; 2; 3; 4g where the agents
are on a circle and each agent is connected to her two neighbours, i.e.,
T0 =
0BBB@
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1CCCA.
This network is connected and aperiodic and its Perron-Frobenius eigenvector is (1; 1; 1; 1).
Example 1 (beliefs never change and remain at q0) : Let the initial beliefs be q0(1) =
(3
4
; 3
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
). Note that with these beliefs and network matrixT0, j2N(q
j
0(1))
j = j2N(q
j
0(0))
j =
(3
4
)2(1
4
)2 and so Assumption 1 is not satised. For this starting point, q0, updating ac-
cording to the BPI heuristic leads to a second period vector of posterior beliefs which is
the same as q0. To see this take agent 2 for example. At the end of period 1 his belief
will be
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q21(1) =
q10(1)q
2
0(1)q
3
0(1)
q10(1)q
2
0(1)q
3
0(1) + q
1
0(0)q
2
0(0)q
3
0(0)
=
3
4
3
4
1
4
3
4
3
4
1
4
+ 1
4
1
4
3
4
=
3
4
= q20(1)
Similarly this will be the case for the others, as the neighbours information always
cancels out. So while each agents beliefs converges, these beliefs do not converge to the
same one.
Example 2 (beliefs alternate and never converge): Assume the same state space and
network as above but now consider the initial beliefs q0(1) = (34 ;
1
4
; 3
4
; 1
4
). Note again
that with these beliefs and network matrix T0, j2N(q
j
0(1))
j = j2N(q
j
0(0))
j = (3
4
)2(1
4
)2
and so Assumption 1 is not satised. Note that for this starting point, q0, updating
according to the BPI heuristic leads to a second period vector of posterior beliefs which
is a permutation of q0. To see this take agent 2 for example. At the end of period 1 his
belief will be
q21(1) =
q10(1)q
2
0(1)q
3
0(1)
q10(1)q
2
0(1)q
3
0(1) + q
1
0(0)q
2
0(0)q
3
0(0)
=
3
4
1
4
3
4
3
4
1
4
3
4
+ 1
4
3
4
1
4
=
3
4
>
1
4
= q20(1)
The opposite will happen for agent 3:
q31(1) =
q40(1)q
3
0(1)q
4
0(1)
q40(1)q
3
0(1)q
4
0(1) + q
4
0(0)q
3
0(0)q
4
0(0)
=
1
4
3
4
1
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
+ 3
4
1
4
3
4
=
1
4
<
3
4
= q30(1)
Therefore, at each period beliefs permutate, with each agent acquiring the beliefs of his
(left) neighbour So in this case again beliefs do not converge.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Proposition 1 Assume that T is connected (irreducible) and aperiodic and that q0 and
T satisfy Assumption 1. Then there exists a vector  = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn+ such that: (i)
the limit posterior beliefs of all players converge to a degenerate belief on the maximiser
of j2N(q
j
0(!))
j : (ii) the vector  is parallel to the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of T.
To see the intuition of the result, consider the complete network. Note that after the
rst period of communication, all would have the same beliefs, at q1(!)  i2N q
i
0(!)P
2
 i2N q
i
0()
:
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After the second period, beliefs would be at q2(!)  (q1(!))nP
2
(q1())n
and more generally at
the k0th period, beliefs would be at qk(!)  (q1(!))n
k 1P
2
(q1())n
k 1 : Thus, when k !1; we would
have that for any two states ! and !0;
qk(!)
qk(!0)
= [
q1(!)
q1(!0)
]n
k 1 !k!1 1 if q1(!) > q1(!0) and otherwise to 0.
Therefore, the mode of the -weighted BPI is important in determining the limit beliefs.
The following example illustrates the implications of Proposition 1.
Example 3: Let us consider the following simple example. Consider three players.
Player 1 is connected to both 2 and 3, while each of them is only connected to player 1 (a
starnetwork). Thus, the T matrix is (recall that every player is connected to herself
as well):
T =
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
:
When communication is repeated innitely, then beliefs in society converge to a distri-
bution that puts equal weights on a subset of the modes of q(!) = (q
1
0(!))
p
2q20(!)q30(!)P
v2
(q
1
0(v))
p
2q20(v)q30(v)
:
This arises from calculating the eigenvector of T which is (
p
2; 1; 1): Thus, the procedure
is simple, and the nature of the consensus depends on the matrix T: As mentioned above,
generically, q(!) will have a unique mode. For example, for any (T;q0); any open set
of perturbations in q0 will result in a subset of these inducing a unique mode, while only
some specic perturbations will induce a set of modes.
4 Implications
We now use Proposition 1 to derive testable predictions about repeated communication in
networks. The predictions will also allow us to di¤erentiate our model from the DeGroot
(1974) heuristic, according to which individuals average othersand theirs beliefs (see De
Marzo et al 2003 and Golub and Jackson 2010, 2012). Note that one crucial di¤erence is
methodological. That is, the DeGroot heuristic does not generally correspond to Bayesian
updating.8 The BPI heuristic on the other hand coincides with Bayesian updating what-
ever the information structures are, as long as they are conditionally independent. Using
the BPI therefore allows us to understand what are the biases in information processing
8This is so only in a limited set of environments. One example is when each information structure is
a normal distribution.
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that we are modelling. In particular the BPI departs from Bayesian updating due to
individuals neglecting the correlation across their information sources (which arises with
repeated communication). This bias has been recently identied by experiments in nance
and political economy.9
We henceforth assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satised so that we can
discuss the implications of the limit beliefs and focus on the generically unique mode of
q(!); denoted by !:
4.1 Polarisation of beliefs and consensus dynamics
A recent literature, e.g., Glaeser and Sunstein (2009), attempts to explain the phenomena
of group polarisation.10 We can say that group polarisation arises whenever the limit
beliefs are not in the convex hull of q0: Note that when considering the DeGroot heuristic,
the limit consensus beliefs cannot become polarised as they must be contained in the
convex hull of individualsbeliefs due to the averaging procedure of DeGroot. On the
other hand, with the BPI, given that we start with beliefs that are full support, and beliefs
generically become degenerate on !; the mode of q(!); then we have polarisation.
The literature also discusses the relation between correlation neglect and polarisation
of beliefs in groups, as for example in Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) and Schkade et al
(2010). Sobel (2014) illustrates that correlation neglect is not a necessary condition for
polarisation as it could arise also with Bayesian rational decision makers. Similarly, as
the BPI corresponds with Bayesian updating for some environments, also in our model
polarisation can arise for rational individuals. Consider for example the fully connected
network and assume that there is only one round of communication. For a large enough
n; for many vectors of beliefs q0, beliefs will become degenerate. However, as we show
below, whether the polarised beliefs accord with the truth or not does depend on whether
correlation neglect arises or not. After one round of communication beliefs are always
rational with the BPI, whereas repeated communication will entail convergence to the
truth only in some environments.
The polarisation property of the BPI implies that small biases towards one state in the
initial set of beliefs can loom large, as the example below illustrates:
Example 4 (Small biases loom large): Suppose that a share 1  " of the network has
uniform beliefs while a share " has beliefs which put a weight 1j
j +  on some state !

(and naturally a weight of 1j
j   on some other state(s)): In this case, q(!) has a unique
9See Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), Eyster and Weizsacker (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009) and
Enke and Zimmermann (2013).
10Experiments on group polarisation were initiated by Stoner (1968).
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mode on !: Thus, even for a small  and "; as well as for a low network centrality of the
share " of individuals with the biased beliefs, society converges to degenerate beliefs on
!: Thus, correlation neglect implies that small biases towards one state will accentuate
in the long term.
Another simple observation is how consensus can be achieved but is not static. In the
DeGroot model, once a consensus is achieved, it will never change, as beliefs are combined
by averaging others. In contrast, with the BPI, correlation neglect implies that individuals
will keep on learning from others and substantially change their beliefs even when their
posterior beliefs are similar -as long as they are not degenerate. Therefore, with the BPI
heuristic consensus can change dynamically.
Example 5 (Changing Consensus): To illustrate, consider an example with binary
states, 1 or 0, and a complete network. The posterior belief of each individual is qi0 2 (0; 1)
which denotes the probability that the state is 1. If all individuals have the same beliefs,
qi = qj  q; with the DeGroot heuristic these would remain unchanged. In contrast, with
the BPI, beliefs would become q
n
qn+(1 q)n after the rst period. While consensus in society
would remain, beliefs change and individuals would converge to have degenerate beliefs
on state 1 if q
n
qn+(1 q)n >
1
2
and on state 0 if q
n
qn+(1 q)n <
1
2
.
4.2 A Measure of Inuence
How can we measure the inuence of an individual? As the result in Proposition 1 shows,
what is important is the e¤ect of individuals on the mode of q(:): The mode ! satises
q(!)
q(v)
=
j2N(q
j
0(!
))
j
j2N(q
j
0(v))
j
> 1 for all v 6= !;
and thus individual i0s e¤ect on the mode depends on both his centrality in the network,
i; as well as on the properties of his beliefs. We now explore these two ways of measuring
the inuence of an individual.
Denition 2: Suppose the limit beliefs change from a degenerate belief on state ! to
a degenerate belief on state !^: The new belief becomes closer to j0s beliefs compared with
the old belief if qj0(!^
) > qj0(!
):
Proposition 2: Suppose that j increases to ^j: Then the new limit beliefs !^ either
does not change or if it does, it becomes closer to j0s beliefs:
Proof: Note that
q^(!)
q^(v)
=
q(!)
q(v)
qj0(!)
^j j
qj0(v)
^j j :
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As a result, q^
(!)
q^(v) > (<)
q(!)
q(v) for all q
j
0(!) > (<)q
j
0(v) implying that either the mode
remains the same or it changes to another mode !^ 6= ! but in this case q^(!)
q^(!^) <
q(!)
q(!^)
implying qj0(!
) < qj0(!^
) as desired.
Remark: Analogous to network centrality, one can be more inuential if he puts more
weight on his posterior as compared to his peers. One way to model this with the BPI
is to assume that an overcondent individual i; at period k + 1, updates his beliefs to
qik(!)
jjTij=1;j 6=iq
j
k(!)P
2
 q
i
k(v)
jjTij=1;j 6=iq
j
k(v)
; where  > 1: It is easy to see then that the consensus would shift
towards individuals i with  > 1 (as others incorporate the beliefs of individual i) and as
 grows large, i would become more and more inuential. Overcondence is therefore a
substitute to network centrality.
We now focus on how changes in initial beliefs qj0(:) a¤ect the limit beliefs in the group.
Suppose one can order the set of states in some natural way. We say that ! is closer to
!j than v if travelling along this order from v to !j you pass through !: Consider
then beliefs for individual j that are unimodal (single-peaked), and let !j be the mode
of the beliefs of individual j:
Denition 3: An individual j0s beliefs q^j0(:) become more condent in state !
j com-
pared to qj0(:) if
q^j0(!)
q^j0(v)
>
qj0(!)
qj0(v)
for any ! that is closer to !j than v :
What happens to the mode of q^(:) which follows individual j becoming more condent
in her own mode? Note that
q^(!)
q^(v)
=
q(!)
q(v)
qj0(v)
qj0(w)
q^j0(!)
q^j0(v)
:
Thus for any ! that is closer to !j than v; we have q^
(!)
q^(v) >
q(!)
q(v) ; and specically
q^(!j)
q^(v) >
q(!j)
q(v) for all v 6= !j: However, for all ! closer to !j than !; we have that q^
(!)
q^(!) >
q(!)
q(!) :
Thus, it must be that either the new mode remains at !; or that it moves to !^ that is
closer to !j: So then again we have:
Proposition 3: Consider single peaked beliefs for individual j: If individual js be-
liefs become more condent in his mode then the limit beliefs become closer to js beliefs.
Moreover, for any full support vectors of beliefs ( q10 ; q
2
0; ; ; q
n
0 ); there exists a K such that
if q
j
0(!
j)
qj0(v)
> K for all v 6= !j; then ! = !j:
At the extreme, when individual j becomes almost fully condent in state !j; and in
the limit of such sequences of beliefs we would have q
j
0(!
j)
qj0(v)
!1 for all v 6= !j; we would
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also have q
(!j)
q(v) ! 1: Thus, by continuity, an individual with a su¢ ciently informative
original signal would induce society to converge to his beliefs.
4.3 Convergence to the truth in large networks
Do individuals reach the correct beliefs in the limit? In the rst period of communication,
the BPI heuristic is consistent with rationality (when information is initially independent).
Thus, with the BPI, in a oneo¤ interaction where each individual has independent in-
formation, information is aggregated in the sense that updating is rational. But in a
repeated interaction, as individuals neglect the correlation in their information, this is
not necessarily the case. Individuals learning might actually unravel, as illustrated in
Example 5 above.11
Still, as in Golub and Jackson (2010), in large societies organized in su¢ ciently balanced
networks, information would be fully aggregated in the limit. Suppose that the true state
is ! and individuals receive independent (and informative) signals. Golub and Jackson
(2010) dene a sequence of networks (Tn)1n=1 to be wiseif beliefs converge (in probabil-
ity) to be degenerate on !: Let qi1;n(!) be the limit beliefs of individual i for a network Tn
as dened in (1), when k !1:A network is wise then if plimn!1maxin jqi1;n(!) 1j = 0:
Proposition 4 Suppose that (Tn)1n=1 is a sequence of irreducible and aperiodic matrices
such that in !n!1 jn for all i; j. Then the network is wise.
To see the intuition, consider a complete network. Once society is large enough, then
already after the rst round of communication, beliefs would be fairly concentrated around
!; and repeated communication will only accentuate this as it leads the beliefs to the mode.
For more general networks, if q(!) mimics the correct rational beliefs, which is the case
when i !n!1 j for all i; j, then learning will arise. That is, correlation neglect that
arises from repeated communication is mitigated by the rational learning in the initial
stages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we advocate the use of a rationalheuristic to explore information di¤usion
in repeated exchanges in networks. The BPI heuristic is rational in the sense that it follows
Bayesian updating for all information structures that satisfy conditional independence
across individuals. We have shown that the limit beliefs converge to the mode of a simple
extension of the BPI, which implies that beliefs become polarised in society, and that
11This is related to the unlearningresult of Gagnon-Bartsch and Rabin (2015).
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consensus beliefs will still change. These results di¤er from those derived in previous
literature using the DeGroot heuristic.
One possible avenue for further research is to consider the co-evolution of information
transmission and the network itself. For example, as in the homophily literature (e.g.,
Golub and Jackson 2012), individuals may not communicate with those that have beliefs
which di¤er substantially from their own. Thus while this fosters polarisation, it also
makes belief in society more immune to those with strong beliefs. Individuals with strong
beliefs are more likely to be di¤erent from others, and may not be as inuential as in our
model. This may a¤ect the speed at which society polarises.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that the posterior of individual i at stage k + 1 is given
by
j(q
j
0(!))
TkijP
!2
 j(q
j
0)
Tkij
Where Tk = TT :::T| {z }
k times
:
If T is strongly connected (irreducible) and aperiodic, then it is primitive and we can
use the PerronFrobenius Theorem for primitive matrices. This theorem states:
1. There is a positive real number r > 1, which is an eigenvalue of T and any other
eigenvalue  satises jj < r.
2. There exists a right eigenvector v of T with eigenvalue r such that all components
of v are positive (respectively, there exists a positive left eigenvector w).
3. limk!1Tk=rk = P where P = vwT , where the left and right eigenvectors for T are
normalized so that wTv = 1. Moreover, the convergence is exponential.
Therefore we have that T
k
rk
converging to a matrix of rank 1. Let T = wT :
We now show that this implies that all individualsbeliefs converge to a degenerate
distribution on a subset of the modes of j2N(q
j
0(!))
j : For simplicity assume that there
is only one mode of j2N(q
j
0(!))
j and denote it by !:
Consider some linear order on 
 and for any stage k let Fk(!) =
P
!0!(j2N (q
j
0(!
0))
Tkij
vir
k
)vir
k
P
2
(j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
be the cumulative probability function of individual i. vi is the relevant coordinate for i
in the eigenvector v:
Let Nk be the cardinality of the support of the beliefs at period k; which is bounded
by N1 = \jSupp(qj0(!)) and is therefore nite for any k: If, as we assume, the beliefs are
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full support than the cardinality is just that of 
:
Claim 1: Let ! < !; then limk!1 Fk(!) = 0:
Proof: Let ! < ! and let " = jj2N(qj0 (!))j  max!0! j2N(qj0 (!0))j j: Also, let k
be such that for all k > k; jj2N(qj0 (!))
Tkij
vir
k  max!0! j2N(qj0 (!0))
Tkij
vir
k j > "
2
:
Remember that Fk(!) =
P
!0!(j2N ((q
j
0(!
0))
Tkij
vir
k
)vir
k
P
2
(j2N ((q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
=
P
!0!(
j2N ((q
j
0(!
0))
Tkij
vir
k
max! j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
P
!2
((
j2N ((q
j
0(!))
Tk
ij
vir
k
max! j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
 N1
P
!2
((
j2N ((q
j
0(!))
Tk
ij
vir
k
max! j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
; as in the nominator we have a sum of expressions which
are all less than 1 or 1.
Therefore,
Fk(!)  N1
P
!2
((
j2N ((q
j
0(!))
Tk
ij
vir
k
max! j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
)vir
k
< N1
((1+))vir
k !limk!1 0; for  = "=2
max! j2N (q
j
0())
Tk
ij
vir
k
:
Claim 2: Let ! > !; then limk!1 Fk(!) = 1:
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Claim 1 by focusing on 1  F (!):
Proof of Proposition 4: Note that if we have a set of n independent posteriors, by
Proposition 1, j2N (q
j
0(!))P
v2
 j2N (q
j
0(v))
will converge to the true distribution with n ! 1: Recall
that the true parameter is !; and thus this distribution will have j2N (q
j
0(!))P
!2
 j2N (q
j
0(!))
! 1:
Note also that j2N (q
j
0(!))
jP
!2
 j2N (q
j
0(!))
j
; when j = c for all j; would replicate exactly the same
distribution for all n:
Note now that for any " > 0; there exists n0; such that for all n > n0; jin   j < " for
any i: Note that as the true state is !; the belief j2N (q
j
0(!))
jP
!2
 j2N (q
j
0(!))
j
will have one mode, on
!:
We also know that for any n; there exist k0; such that for any k > k0; then limk!1 F nk (!)
is a degenerate distribution on the modes of j2N (q
j
0(!))
jP
!2
 j2N (q
j
0(!))
j
:
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Therefore, there exists an n0; such that for any n > n0; limk!1 F nk (!) converges to a
degenerate distribution on the modes of j2N (q
j
0(!))
jP
!2
 j2N (q
j
0(!))
j
: For this part we can essentially
repeat the proof in Proposition 2 with ! = !: That is, for any n > n0; there exists k > k0;
such that jj2N(qj0 (!))
Tkij
vir
k  max!0! j2N(qj0 (!0))
Tkij
vir
k j > "
2
; and the rest follows.
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